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shipping spheres, from Chambers of Commerce, and from arbitration bodies. There are over fifty national
branches. The work of the Association is promoted and supervised by the Executive Council which meets
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the Board's Audit Committee and the Committee on Development Effectiveness. The Committee also wishes
to acknowledge the New Haven School of international law. Myers McDougal, Harold Lasswell, Michael
Reisman, and other practitioners of the New Haven School drew upon social sciences in their study of
international law. The New Haven school included institutional actors and values as legitimate characteristics
of international law, distinguishing the New Haven school from international relations realists who viewed
international law as the outcome of state power relations and positivists who dismissed international law
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I. PURPOSE OF BREITON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
Under the Marshall Plan after World War H, the United States gave $13
billion to rebuild western Europe. But some historians argue that the United
States' most important legacy was its role in establishing the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), named the Bretton Woods institutions,
after the site of the conference in 1944 in New Hampshire. At Bretton Woods,
forty-four allies agreed to a multilateral institutional framework designed to
restore economic growth and monetary stability.
This Article discusses what happened when the United States gradually
relinquished its original commitment to multilateralism at Bretton Woods. By
the time of the Bush Administration, the United States was abusing its authority
at the World Bank as a hegemon. In order to establish this regrettable state of
affairs, first the purpose and governance framework of the Bretton Woods
institutions, as originally designed, is examined against international precedent,
standards, applicable treaties, laws and norms. Then, the transparency of the
Bretton Woods institutions is assessed, as well as the impartiality of the
institutions tasked with evaluating their performance. The effectiveness of the
Bretton Woods institutions' oversight agencies is also examined, as well as the
integrity of the World Bank's anti-fraud unit. Finally, efforts to improve
accountability of the Bretton Woods institutions are discussed with a particular
focus on grievance reform and the fate of whistleblowers.
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The World Bank and the IMF will be instrumental in overcoming the
effects of the international financial meltdown. The IMF is charged with
monitoring the role of the official sector in financing United States' current
account deficits. The current financial crisis has simultaneously called the
wisdom of American regulatory authorities into question and impaired the
stability of U.S. dollar exchange rates. The international dollar standard is at
risk. The governance structure of the Bretton Woods institutions matters, not
only as this affects the policy and decision framework of these organizations,
but also insofar as this orders and reflects changing international financial
relationships. The United States cannot expect its allies to respond to the
challenges of the global financial crisis unless it is prepared to respect its
existing multilateral obligations under Bretton Woods. Moreover, in the face
of growing deficits, the United States can ill afford to ignore the call of British
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, for a
new Bretton Woods conference.
The initial purpose of the World Bank was to finance the reconstruction
of war-torn Europe. After this was accomplished, the World Bank became the
primary financier of development projects in the Third World. The purpose of
the IMF was to allocate access to international currency reserves within the
system of par values (set values for each member's currency in terms of gold),
convertibility of members' currencies, and fixed but adjustable exchange rates.
After World War II, the U.S. dollar became the main currency for international
capital flows outside of Europe.
The delegates to the Bretton Woods Conference considered a draft
agreement prepared in April 1942 by Harry D. White of the U.S. Treasury and
a draft that was prepared in June 1944 by the United Kingdom, principally by
Lord John Maynard Keynes, who chaired the U.K. delegation to the Bretton
Woods Conference. Lord Keynes recognized the special role of international
lawyers in founding the Bretton Woods institutions:
We, the Delegates ofthis Conference, Mr. President, have been trying
to accomplish something very difficult to accomplish... It has been
our task to find a common measure, a common standard, a common
rule applicable to each and not irksome to any. We have been
operating, moreover, in a field of great intellectual and technical
difficulty. We have had to perform at one and the same time the tasks
appropriate to the economist, to the financier, to the politician, to the
journalist, to the propagandist, to the lawyer, to the statesman--even,
I think, to the prophet and to the soothsayer .... I am certain that no
similar conference within memory has achieved such a bulk of lucid,
solid construction. We owe this not least to the indomitable will and
energy, always governed by good temper and humor of Harry White.
But this has been as far removed as can be imagined from a one-man
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or two-man or three-man conference. It has been teamwork,
teamwork such as I have seldom experienced. And for my own part,
I should like to pay a particular tribute to our lawyers... I have been
known to complain that, to judge from results in this lawyer-ridden
land, the Mayflower, when she sailed from Plymouth, must have been
entirely filled with lawyers. When I first visited Mr. Morgenthau in
Washington some three years ago accompanied only by my secretary,
the boys in your Treasury curiously inquired of him--where is your
lawyer? When it was explained that I had none--"Who then does
your thinking for you?" was the rejoinder. That is not my idea of a
lawyer. I want him to tell me how to do what I think sensible, and,
above all, to devise means by which it will be lawful for me to go on
being sensible in unforeseen conditions some years hence. Too often
lawyers busy themselves to make commonsense illegal. Too often
lawyers are men who turn poetry into prose and prose into jargon.
Not our lawyers here in Bretton Woods. On the contrary they have
turned our jargon into prose and our prose into poetry. And only too
often they have had to do our thinking for us. We owe a great debt of
gratitude to Dean Acheson, Oscar Cox, Luxford, Brenner, Collado,
Arnold, Chang, Broches and our own Beckett of the British
Delegation.'
Aaron Broches, who was then a young counsellor at the Dutch Embassy,
went on to work in the legal department of the World Bank, ultimately as its
longest-serving General Counsel from 1959-1978. Aaron Broches considered
the most important function of the legal department to be that of ensuring that
the Presidency and Board of Executive Directors observed their respective
powers laid out in the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank. Mr. Broches'
ability to mediate between the presidency and board was severely challenged
when Robert McNamara assumed the presidency of the World Bank. After his
retirement, Mr. Broches counseled, "When the President of the World Bank
comes from the Pentagon, the role of the General Counsel becomes all the more
critical in preserving the authority of the Board."2
By the early 1960s, the U.S. dollar's fixed value against gold was
considered to be overvalued. Increased domestic spending on President
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs and military spending on the
Vietnam War gradually worsened the overvaluation of the dollar. In 1971 the
United States informed the IF that it would no longer buy and sell gold to
settle international transactions. This resulted in the 1973 decision of the
1. Lord Keynes, Chairman, Delegation of the U.K., Address at the Closing Plenary Session (July
1-22, 1944), in Proceedings and Documents of the U.N. Monetary and Financial Conference, Doc. 542, Vol.
11, Bretton Woods, N.H., July 1-22, 1944, at 1240-41.
2. Conversation between Aaron Broches and Karen Hudes, October 5, 1995.
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European Community countries and the United States to introduce a joint float
of European currencies against the U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, the U.S. dollar
maintained its role as "international money." The role of the IMF became less
well-defined but in principle turned into one of surveillance and support for
currencies in maintaining a stable link with major currencies.
I. WORLD BANK'S ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION
At the turn of the twenty-first century, poverty remains a global problem
of huge proportions.3 Despite continuous attempts to address the issue, the
divide between the North and the South, i.e., the "haves" and the "have-nots,"
remains. The phenomenon ofglobalization has not overcome the divide. While
the two Bretton Woods institutions have influenced developing countries'
policies, by requesting sweeping macro-economic, micro-economic, and
governance reforms based on lending conditionalities, these reforms have not
enabled the developing countries to catch up. Critics of the Bretton Woods
institutions have been justified in questioning the content of the policy reform
they promoted.4
In light of the Bretton Woods institutions' increasingly tough governance
lending conditionalities, rule of law requirements, and measures for holding
those who manage these countries' economic and social resources accountable
for their actions, critics have also turned around and taken a close look at the
Bretton Woods institutions' own internal rule of law record. In connection with
inquiries into the Bretton Woods institutions' rule of law record, light has been
3. Of the world's 6 billion people, 1.4 billion live on less than $2 a day, and 1.2 billion live on less
than $1 a day. WorldBank Updates Poverty Estimates for the Developing World, THE WORLD BANK, Nov.
3, 2008, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCHO,,contentMDK:
21882162-pagePK:64165401-piPK:64165026-theSitePK:469382,00.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
Additionally, "the average income in the richest twenty countries is thirty-seven times the average in the
poorest twenty-a gap that has doubled in the past forty years." Press Release, The World Bank, New World
Bank Report Urges Broader Approach to Reducing Poverty (Sept. 12, 2000), http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNALINEWS/O,,contentMDK:20015156-menuPK:34463-pagePK:64003015
-piPK:64003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). Moreover, developing countries'
external debt reached extreme proportions with many countries being forced to use aid to service old debt
instead of promoting economic growth.
4. From an economics perspective, see generally JOSEPH E. STIGL1TZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (2002); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF HUNDRED DAYS: How WASHINGTON MISMANAGED
GLOBALIZATION (2000); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROwTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES
AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2001). From a legal and foreign policy perspective, see Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte, Die Rolle der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen im Nord-Sfld-Konflikt, in DAS
INTERNATIONALE RECHT mi NoRD-SOD-VERHTNIS 149 (Werner Meng et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Die
Rolle der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen]; Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Sovereign Debt: The Argentine
Bonds Case, in LIBER AMICORUM MICHAEL BOTHE-FREDEN IN FREIHEIT, PEACE IN LIBERTY, PAIX EN
LIBERTE 973, 973-1018 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Sovereign Debt].
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shed on a crucial defect in the design of international organizations (1Os) in
general, and the Bretton Woods institutions in particular, i.e., a lack of
accountability of these organizations if measured by modern standards.5
1Os, as creatures of traditional international law, come with few account-
ability features. Beyond a hierarchically organized chain of responsibility of
the institutions' organs (e.g., the IMF Managing Director and the World Bank's
President respond to the Executive Board or the Board of Executive Directors
respectively who in turn respond to the Board of Governors or the
representatives of all members), few internal, let alone external, accountability
mechanisms exist in these institutions.
lOs generally, and Bretton Woods institutions particularly, lack checks and
balances or oversight mechanisms that are known cornerstones of democracies.
This is a result of the absence of separation of powers known in state context,
but unusual in the context of international organizations.6 On the contrary, the
Bretton Woods institutions' organizational structure features a rudimentary
accountability system based on its internal hierarchy. Hence, IMF staff is
responsible to the IMF Managing Director and World Bank staff is responsible
to its President. The IMF Managing Director/World Bank President report to
the IMF Executive Board/World Bank Board of Executive Directors. The IMF
Executive Board/World Bank Board of Executive Directors is watched over by
the IMF/World Bank Board of Governors.7 While this organizational scheme
of responsibility resembles the internal governance structure of corporations
incorporated under domestic law, it differs in the final analysis because it does
not include checks and balances guaranteeing mechanisms such as fiduciary
duties of directors and officers resulting in personal liability upon breach of
their duties.8
5. See, e.g., Peter Slinn, Law, Accountability and Development, 1993 THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUDIES vii, viii (1993) (noting the emergence of the notion of accountability in connection with debates on
the role of law in the development process). More recently, see THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY-THE
WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND GRASS RooTs MOVEMENTS (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
6. For details of the absence of checks and balances in Bretton Woods institutions, see Die Rolle
der internationalen Finanzinstitutionent, supra note 4, at 197-209.
7. Note that, similar to corporations incorporated under domestic law, Bretton Woods institutions'
members hold shares or quotas representing ownership interest in these organizations and resulting in
corresponding capital subscriptions and voting rights.
8. Directors' and officers' fiduciary duties are recognized core concepts of corporate governance
both in common law and civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 141, 142 (2003) (date and
complementing case law); Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 8.31, 8.42 (1979) (adopted by numerous states in the
United States); Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act] §§ 93, 116, in German Stock Corp. Act 82, 99
(Friedrich K. Juenger & Lajos Schmidt trans., 1967); see also Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act],
available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/aktg/gesamt.pdf(last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (which
provides the most current version of the Stock Corporation Act as it is effective and applicable in Germany).
[Vol. 15:2
Hudes and Schlemmer-Schulte
The Bretton Woods institutions' governance paradigm is limited to
appointment/election of Executive Directors by members (I!MF)/shareholders
(World Bank), and the appointment of the IMF Managing Director/World Bank
President and their removal from office by the Executive Directors.9 In reality,
even the appointment of the IMF Managing Director and the World Bank
President is only formally made by the Executive Directors. Defacto for over
sixty years the IMF and World Bank were subject to a "Gentlemen's
Agreement," whereby Europeans appointed the Managing Director of the IMF,
and the United States appointed the President of the World Bank.
In terms of transparency, the IMF is only required to publish its annual
reports and quarterly summary statements of its operations and transactions and
its holdings of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), gold and currencies of
members.'" The World Bank must equally publish an annual report and
quarterly (or at other intervals) summary statements of its financial position as
well as a profit and loss statement." Both the IMF and the World Bank's
annual reports contain audited statements of their accounts. 2
I. ROLE OF PRESIDENT AND BOARD OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
A. Board of Executive Directors
At the Bretton Woods Conference there was a deliberate attempt to learn
from pitfalls in the governance structure of the League ofNations. The Bretton
Woods institutions each have a Board of twenty-four Executive Directors
9. See International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, art. XII(2)(a), (4)(a) (amended Nov.
11, 1992) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
Articles of Agreement, art. V(2)(a), (5)(a) (amended effective Feb. 16, 1989) [hereinafter IBRD Articles of
Agreement]; International Development Association Articles of Agreement, art. Vl(4)(b), (5)(a) (effective
Sept. 24, 1960) [hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement].
10. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. XHI(7)(a). The IMF is, in effect, a repository
for its members' currencies and a portion of their foreign exchange reserves. Out of this pool of currencies,
the IMF extends short-term credit to members in balance of payments difficulties. The pool of currencies held
by the IMF includes the SDR which started as gold-based reserve assets in 1967 and was redefined as a basket
of currencies in 1974 upon the demise of the gold standard. Today, the SDR basket of currencies is
composed of the US Dollar, the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the British Pound Sterling.
11. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(1 3)(a); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra
note 9, art. VI(l l)(a).
12. Today, the IMF's financial statements comply with International Accounting Standards (LAS)
with respect to all accounts the IMF manages, i.e., its general resources account, its SDR account, and the
accounts of its low-income-countries facilities. The World Bank's statements apply U.S. GAAP (generally
accepted accounting principles) when accounting for the World Bank's own accounts (IBRD and IDA).
However, trust funds other than those administered together with the IMF are not accounted for based on
GAAP or IAS.
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functioning in continuous session in Washington. 3 The Executive Directors
are appointed by the sovereign countries of their constituency, but also serve as
officials of the Bretton Woods institutions and are expected to exercise
individual judgment in the institutional interests of these organizations. 4
Public international organizations like the World Bank are governed by a
regime based on their respective constitutive treaties rather than on any system
of national law. The fact that the Bretton Woods institutions' Executive
Directors work continuously at headquarters, receive a salary, and are expected
to serve the interests of all members was taken into account in the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations. 5 When the governance of international organizations is under
increasing scrutiny, 6 the Executive Directors serve an important function in
ensuring accountability to the constituencies they serve.
B. Presidency
The first World Bank President, Eugene Meyer, had an acrimonious
relationship with the Board of Executive Directors and resigned after six
months. The second President, John Jay McCloy, insisted on arrangements that
13. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art (V)(4Xe); IMF Articles ofAgreement, supra note
9, art. XUI(3)(g). Five Executive Directors are appointed by the members with the five largest numbers of
shares (currently the United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom). Three additional
countries with large holdings of shareholder capital are also single country constituencies: China, the Russian
Federation, and Saudi Arabia. The remaining Executive Directors are elected by the other members. There
were originally twelve Executive Directors.
14. Memorandum from Ibrahim Shihata to Mrs. Eveline Hertkens (May 27, 1994) (with the ILA
Committee); see also IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS 656-57 (2000).
15. Sub-Comm. on Privileges and Immunities, Report of the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly on Coordination of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and of the Specialized
Agencies, U.N. Doc. A/503 (Nov. 21, 1947), provides:
Article VI applies to officials of the specialized agencies. It must be noted that the
constitutional instruments of the specialized agencies include officers (such as, for
example, the Chairman of the Council of [ICAO] or the Executive Directors of the
[Bank and Fund]) who serve for continuous periods either not as representatives of any
Government at all or, as in the case of the Executive Directors of the Bank and the
Fund, partly as representatives of Governments but predominantly as representing the
interests of all Members, receiving their salaries from the Organization. It was
considered that these officers should be regarded, for the purposes of this convention,
rather as officials than as representatives of Members, although they do not come
within the cadre of officials of the agency in the strict sense.
Id. For a recount of the historic record, see EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK
SINCE BRETTON WOODS 87-89 (1973).
16. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization 's Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions
More Accountable, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2001), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2001/4.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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reduced the power and authority of the Board. Under these arrangements, the
Board of Executive Directors agreed that it would refrain from initiating actions
and review initiatives introduced by the President. This informal agreement
continued to serve as a limit on the powers of the World Bank's Board of
Executive Directors until recent proposals of a working group on internal
governance of the Board of Directors.' 7
In 1980, a Working Group of Executive Directors reviewed the rules and
procedures on Executive Directors' access to information and presented
proposals to the President to improve such access, including tours d'horizon by
the President to periodically review current problems and major policy issues,
and to provide for discussions of sector work. A memorandum prepared by
then-General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata on September 28, 1987 for the Ad Hoc
Committee on Board Procedures concluded:
As this survey indicates, the role of the Executive Directors has
evolved considerably in the course of the Bank's history under
provisions of the Articles of Agreement, which have by their
generality allowed such an evolution. The definition of the respective
roles of the Executive Directors and Management has changed, and
can continue to change, to allow the Bank to be as responsive as it
may to the wishes of its members in the attainment of its development
objectives.'8
C. Small Body of Law Applicable to IOs/Bretton Woods Institutions
While 1Os have proliferated over the last century-with over 600
organizations now in existence' 9-the volume of law that, according to the
majority view (expressed by consistent practice by lOs themselves,
international jurisprudence, and in the literature), applies to these IOs is quite
17. Statement by Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation of The Netherlands,
Oct. 12, 2008, Doc. DC/S/2008-0063, 12, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/
Documentation/21937376/DCS2008-0063-Netherlands.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009):
Working out the organizational consequences of management's strategic directions
requires a Board that is able to give strategic advice and to oversee the reform of the
Bank's operations, not a Board whose time is dedicated to details and the vetting and
approval of the Bank's many products. My constituency is pleased to learn that the
Board's working group on internal governance has produced a report that sets in
motion a reorientation of the relations between management and the Board that will
benefit the entire governance and effectiveness of the Bank.
Id. For a recount of the historic record, see EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK
SINCE BRETTON WOODS 87-89 (1973).
18. Memorandum from Ibrahim Shihata to AD-Hoc Committee on Board Procedures (Oct. 5,
1987); see also IBRAHIM SHiHATA, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS 646 (2000).
19. See Y.B Int'l Orgs. (2000-04).
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small.2" In fact, the legal framework by which 1Os are bound is rudimentary
since it only includes the lOs charters based on which they were created, the
law they themselves make, and the commitments they enter into. In other
words, international treaties and conventions other than the lOs founding
charters, international customary law, jus cogens, and general principles of
international law, i.e., the bulk of sources of international law, does not apply
to lOs following the majority view.2 The majority view purporting that 1Os are
not bound by general international law is based on the following two major
arguments: lack of consent on the lOs part22 and absence of an explicit
20. In terms of 10's practice, compare, e.g., the Bretton Woods institutions' official approach to
human rights. Most notably, Bretton Woods institutions refer to their charters in this respect but don't feel
bound by human rights conventions etc. For a record to this effect, see Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The
World Bank and Human Rights, 4 AUSTRIAN REV. OF INT'L & EUR. L. 230, 261-62 (1999). For
jurisprudential evidence, see the European Court of Human Rights' (ECHR)judgment of February 18, 1999
in the case of Matthews v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 24833/94, 32 (1999), and the ECHR's decision
of December 12, 2001 in the case Bankovieand others v. Belgium and others, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52207/99, 31
(2001), confirming that European Community (EC) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) would
not be bound by the European Convention on Human Rights. The U.N. themselves do not feel bound by
international or regional human rights regimes either. Why would they otherwise conclude special
agreements with host countries for U.N. peace-keeping missions introducing certain standards of security and
order as well as in terms of human rights. For details on such special agreements, see Michael Bothe, Peace-
keeping, in CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY 572 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994). Finally,
the special U.N. missions in Kosovo and East-Timor which took place below certain human rights standards
reveal the fact that the U.N. did not feel particularly bound by international human rights standards laid out
in human rights conventions concluded by their member states. For that reason, the U.N. establishes their
own terms of reference and standards for such missions and interventions. See Paul C. Szasz, The United
Nations Legislates to Limit Liability, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 739 (1987). For literature arguing that 1Os are bound
by general international law, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Role ofLaw in Economic Development: The Legal
Problems of International Public Ventures, 25 REVUE EGYTIENNE DE DRorr INT'L 125 (1969). For a
modified view, see F. MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 4 (1986)
(pointing out that a number of rules of international law are not applicable to lOs because they have no
territory, confer no nationality and do not exercise jurisdiction in the same sense as states).
21. For a list of the sources ofinternational law, in particular, see Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), art. 38(1), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documentslindex.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009), explicitly referring to international conventions, international custom, general
principles of law. Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute also lists, as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations. Id. The list of the ICJ Statute is not
exhaustive. Among commonly recognized further sources of international law are unilateral acts andjus
cogens norms, a special set of norms of superior value. On sources of international law, see generally
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1997).
22. See ROBERTJENNINGSETAL.,OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONALLAW, Vol.1, 14-16 (9th ed. 1992).
Thus, lOs in general, or Bretton Woods institutions in particular, are not bound by international human rights
conventions which they have not ratified or international customary human rights law to the establishment
of which they have not contributed based on their practice and their opinio juris. The same argument
discards general principles of international law embodying human rights from the list of international law
sources applicable to Bretton Woods institutions. The argument even coversjus cogens. See id.; SHAW,
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international law rule (e.g., formulated by states establishing lOs) stating that
lOs are bound by general international law.
In the absence of the two normally constitutive elements for a finding of
an obligation under international law, i.e., the absence of consent by lOs to the
effect of being bound and the absence of an international law norm binding lOs
to general international law, it is understandable that only a minority opinion
in the literature and jurisprudence23 argues that lOs are bound by general
international law. Proponents of this view suggest that 1Os are bound by
general international law even without their consent and in the absence of an
explicit statement to that effect in their founding charter or elsewhere in order
to avoid that states' members in 1Os escape from their international obligations
by putting on the institutional hat and acting via the lOs without the need to fear
any sanctions for violations of international law that would be used were they
supra note 21, at 96-98 (pointing out that the creation ofjus cogens involves two stages, i.e., "first, the
establishment of the proposition as a rule of general international law and secondly, the acceptance of that
rule as a peremptory norm by the international law community as a whole."). For details onjus cogens or
so-called erga omnes norms, see Shabtai Rosenne, Some Reflections on erga omnes, in LEGAL VISIONS OF
THE 21 ST CENTURY 509-25 (Antony Anghie ed., 1998). For a discussion of a potential trend in the evolution
of international law that increasingly weakens the importance of consent, see Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Law-
making in a Global Society: Does Consent Still Matter?, in INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT UND
MENSCHENRECHTE-FESTSCHRIFT FOR GEORG RESS 191-206 (Jirgen Br6hmer et al. eds., 2005). For an
elaborate discussion ofthejus cogens argument, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing
World, Vol. II HUM. RTS., DEV. & INT'L FIN. INSTITUTIONS 563-64 (1995).
23. Cf Interpretation of the Agreement of25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory
Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90 (Dec. 20) (in connection with the question of an interpretation of the
Agreement of March 25, 1951 between the World Health Organization (WHO) and Egypt). In this opinion,
the ICJ notes in an obiter dictum that "[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law and, as
such, bound by general rules of international law .. " Id. See also HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M.
BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INsTITUmONAL LAW 982-84 (3d ed. 2001). Finally, see the partial award of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Reineccius et al. v. Bank for Int'l Settlements, Hague Ct. Rep.
(Hamilton) 1 (Per. Ct. Arb. 2002). The PCA's award denies the legality of a recall of shares in the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) held by private individuals by applying BIS charter rules as well as general
public international law principles on expropriation. It may be noted that such an application of general
international law to an 10 would not happen in the Bretton Woods institutions context. Bretton Woods
institutions interpret their own mandate and are unlikely to even request only an advisory opinion on a
question pertaining to their mandate and obligations under it to the ICJ although they have that opportunity
under their relationship agreements with the U.N. For further literature in favor of an application of general
international law to lOs, see Henry G. Schermers, De binding van internationale organisaties aan regelingen
ter bescherming van mensenrechten, in RECHTEN VAN DE MENS IN PERSPECTIEF 121-37 (1968); Albert
Bleckmann, Zur Verbindlichkeit des AIlgemeinen V61kerrechts fiir Internationale Organisationen, 37
HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 107 (1977).
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engaging in the same activities as states. 24 This, however, is a policy argument
as opposed to a sound legal argument and hence reflects de legeferenda ideals.
In conclusion, the Bretton Woods institutions' view that they are only
subject to their founding charter and any further law they agree to be subject to
and their firm reluctance to establish outright human rights conditionalities
based on human rights provisions in general international law is legally well
founded.
IV. JUDICIAL FORUMS TESTING LEGALITY OF IO/BRETrON
WOODS INSTITUTIONS' ACTION
lOs are usually immune from the jurisdiction of domestic courts. 25 Both
the IMF's and the World Bank's charter explicitly provide for such immunity
in connection with their core operational activities, i.e., lending to members in
balance of payments difficulties and financing of economic development
projects.26 lOs cannot be sued before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
24. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 23, 983-84 (including further references). Another
argument refers to lOs as the successors of states into all state members' international obligations (treaty,
customs etc.). However, such a succession into state obligations can conceptually only be accepted in the
exceptional case in which the members of an 10 have completely transferred their respective powers to the
1O, e.g., like the European states did with their external economic policy powers to the European Economic
Community (EEC) in the 1950s. While the EEC member states when concluding the GATT in 1948 still
owned the competence on foreign economic policy, they turned this competence over to the EEC when the
latter was founded. Subsequently, the EEC exercised this competence exclusively. See Case 21-24/72, Int'l
Fruit Co. v. Produktschap, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1226. In this case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found
the European Economic Community (EEC) to be bound by the GATT as a result of it succeeding into the
GAIT treaty obligations of the EEC state members and the transfers of powers by the EEC member states
to the EEC in the area of external trade. Usually, when an 10 is created, states do not transfer their powers
to the 10 in a way that the respective powers are exclusively taken over by the 10. Rather, the new 10
receives concurrent powers existing in parallel to similar state powers in the area, or the new 10 is endowed
with special, new powers that never existed in states. Thus, for example, the IMF and the WB engage in
development assistance parallel to bilateral assistance provided by their richer members, or the IMF was
authorized to manage the par value system, a power that no member had held before the IMF was created.
Moreover, the theory of 10's succession into member states' treaty obligations poses practical problems.
Taking the example of human rights treaties concluded by the state members of an 10: To which human
rights treaties should the 10 be subject: to the international, or the regional standards, in human rights
treaties, ratified by some but not all 10 members, the standards with or without reservations, in other words,
the maximum or minimum standard?
25. See KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 42 (James R.
Crawford & John S. Bell eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002); AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 252-316 (2000).
26. It may be noted that the World Bank's charter however explicitly waives this immunity from
thejurisdiction of domestic courts in connection with the Bank's issuance of securities on the private markets
for the purposes of raising capital. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. VII(3); IDA Articles
of Agreement, supra note 9, art. VIII(3). It is only in connection with the Bank's issuance of securities that
domestic law, e.g., the law of the capital market on which securities are offered, applies to the Bank.
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The latter decides only disputes among states. IOs may request advisory
opinions from the ICJ. In particular, the IMF and the World Bank-although
explicitly reminded of the possibility of ICJ advisory opinions by virtue of their
Relationship Agreements with the United Nations (U.N.)-have in principle
refrained from making use of this tool. While ICJ advisory opinions could have
served to answer questions of interpretation of their founding charters such as
to what extent these charters subject the organizations to general international
law, neither the IMF nor the World Bank have ever requested such an opinion.
By contrast, both Washington, D.C.-based Bretton Woods institutions have
reverted to their special and unique charter based vehicle for disputes over
correct interpretation of their charters. The latter empowers the organs of the
two institutions which take the business decisions, i.e., decide on lending and
underlying policies, to also interpret their charters.27 In other words, at the IMF
and the World Bank, the organs deciding on these institutions' actions are also
the ones deciding on the legality of their previously approved actions. For
certain matters, the Bretton Woods institutions are subject to arbitration.28
In terms of interpretation of their charters, both the IMF and the World
Bank accept the notion that while their own organs are the bodies empowered
to authoritatively interpret the charters, the methods of interpretation are those
laid out by the First Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. By contrast,
neither the IMF nor the World Bank refers to the Second Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties concluded between states and IOs and among 1Os.
When it comes to the lending arrangements, both Bretton Woods institutions
enter into these arrangements with their borrowing members, as neither have
ratified the Second Vienna Convention.29
V. BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS' EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES
In 1946, the [MF established an independent External Audit Committee
that oversees the IMF's internal accountants and its external auditor. In 1988
27. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. XXIX; IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra
note 9, art. IX(a); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. X(a).
28. In connection with withdrawal by a member from the IMF and regarding liquidation matters,
the IMF charter provides for international arbitration to solve the respective dispute. See IMF Articles of
Agreement, supra note 9, art. XXIX(c). Equally, the World Bank's charter provides for international
arbitration in cases of disputes arising out of a cessation of membership in the Bank and the termination of
Bank operations. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. IX(c); IDA Articles of Agreement,
supra note 9, art. X(c).
29. Moreover, the IWF does not consider its lending arrangements that allow a member to use IMF
general resources to form an international treaty. Such lending arrangements are rather qualified as
arrangements sui generis.
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and 1992 respectively, the World Bank and the IMF established Administrative
Tribunals to deal with staff grievances.3" In 1994, the World Bank established
the Inspection Panel, an independent fact finding body assisting the World
Bank's Executive Directors in their oversight of Bank management to make
sure that the Bank complies with its own policies and procedures in connection
with its lending activities.3' The World Bank Inspection Panel, while not a
judicial body, introduced the possibility for groups of individuals who are
supposed to benefit from World Bank financed projects, but with whom the
Bank has no contractual relationship, to bring complaints before an independent
forum that investigates complaints against the World Bank. In 2000, the IMF
established the Independent Evaluation Office, an independent advisory body,
assisting the IMF Executive Directors in evaluating its lending policies and
possibly redesigning them.32
The World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (first established in
1973 and renamed the Independent Evaluation Group in 2005), like the IMF's
EO, assesses policies. The Director General of the lEG does not continue
employment with the World Bank after tenure in that position; publications
need not be changed at the wish of World Bank management nor the Board.
3
30. See CHITrHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE:
AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS (1988). Proceedings before these tribunals do,
however, not meet due process standards of employee/civil servant's suits before domestic courts. See M.
Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity
Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53 (1995); Christian Dominic6, Morgan v. World Bank (Ten Years Later), in
LIBERAMICORUM IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT LAw 155-68 (Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-Yung Tung eds., 2001).
31. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL]; Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The
World Bank's New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal
Order, 54 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 392, 392 (1994); Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's
Experience with its Inspection Panel, 58 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 353 (1998); Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte,
The WorldBank Inspection Panel: A Modelfor Other International Organizations?, in PROLIFERATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS-LEGAL ISSUES 483 (Niels Blokker & Henry Schermers eds., 2000); Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte, Building an International Grievance System: The World Bank Inspection
Panel-Selected Issues, in LIBER AMICORUM GEORG RESS-INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT UND
MENSCHENRECHTE 249 (Jtirgen Brrhmer et al. eds., 2005). The Bank's Inspection Panel has handled over
40 complaints brought by private parties; see also The Inspection Panel, www.worldbank.org/inspectionpanel
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
32. The [MF's Independent Evaluation Office has, for example, harshly cited the IMF in connection
with its advice to Argentina. See REPORT OF THE IMF'S INDEP. EVAL. OFFICE, THE IWF AND ARGENTINA,
1991-2001 (IMF/IEO 2004) [hereinafter THE IMF AND ARGENTINA]; see also Sovereign Debt, supra note
4; Independent Evaluation Office (lEO), http'I/www.ieo-imf.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
33. lEG is, however, less independent than the World Bank's Inspection Panel or the IMF's LEO.
The guarantees of independence for inspectors on the World Bank's Inspection Panel are missing for lEG.
Inspectors cannot be directly hired out of the pool of World Bank staffand management. Two years must
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But lEG's actual objectivity has been called into question when lEG failed to
protect a whistleblower who was fired in retaliation for correcting an inaccurate
evaluation to the Board. For this reason, the Chair of the World Bank's Audit
Committee recently determined that an external audit of the World Bank's
internal controls was necessary.34 The World Bank had previously relied upon
EG to certify the World Bank's internal controls. 5
In terms of expanded transparency, both the IMF and the World Bank have
increasingly made publicly available their lending policies as well as
information regarding individual lending arrangements since the 1990s. IMF
decisions on interpretation, lending related policies including those on
conditionalities, and Public Information Notices (PINs) summarizing the
Executive Boards' decisions regarding individual extension of credit are made
publicly available. The full text of IMF stand-by arrangements and related
documents reflecting individual credits are not made publicly available, though,
as "use of the IMF's resources." These arrangements are also not considered to
be international treaties which members would need to file with the United
Nations Secretary General's office. Moreover, with the consent of the
respective member, countries' surveillance reports (or summaries of these
reports) are published. Documents authored by either the borrowing member
or IMF staff in preparation of lending from the PRGF (Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility, the IMF's major low-income-countries facility) are publicly
available in their entirety. IMF assessments of the global economy such as the
World Economic Outlook, the Global Financial Stability Reports, and others
are also made publicly available.
The World Bank also makes its lending policies and procedures publicly
available. The text of individual loans, credits, and guarantees given by the
Bank are normally not posted on the World Bank's webpage.36 As the World
have elapsed since the end of such service. In practice, the World Bank has interpreted service in the World
Bank broadly including even a speaking engagement at a World Bank sponsored conference resulting in the
payment of a modest honorarium ($500) by a full-time professor as grounds enough to preclude individuals
from appointment to the Inspection Panel. Certainly, full-time World Bank managers and staff as well as
consultants may not serve on the Inspection Panel unless two years have passed since they left the World
Bank or completed their consultancy. The prohibition of reemployment of inspectors has been in practice
interpreted broadly as to prohibit even taking positions with the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a special
trust fund administered by the United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Development
Programme, and the World Bank.
34. Meeting held on February 27, 2009 between Mr. Abdulrahman Almofadhi and Drs. Karen
Hudes.
35. See INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP (lEG), THE WORLD BANK, REViEW OF INTERNAL IDA
CONTROLS, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION BY lEG, APPROACH PAPER (July 10, 2006),
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/40198CB36C53E297852
571 C40070183B/$file/ida_controlsapproach_paper.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
36. On rare occasion, however, loan agreements are posted.
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Bank's Policy on Disclosure reveals, the World Bank relies on its borrowing
members filing these documents with the United Nations Secretary General's
(UNSG) office based on the obligation as U.N. members under Article 102,
Section 1 of the U.N. Charter. The World Bank's Legal Department in reality
files with the UNSG on behalf of the borrowers. Similar to the RMF, the World
Bank publishes PINs summarizing projects and programs the financing of
which was approved by the Executive Directors. Provided the respective
borrower agrees, the World Bank publishes Country Assistance Strategies
(CAS) which lay out the World Bank's analysis of a borrowing country's
situation and economic program as well as the World Bank's strategy including
medium term lending goals for the country. Documents prepared by either
World Bank staff or the borrower in connection with lending to poorer
countries (so-called PRSPs or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) are made
publicly available. The World Bank also publishes annual World Development
Reports, and World Economic Prospects and IEG publishes Annual Reviews
of Development Effectiveness, and evaluations of some of its operations.
However, the above efforts, while laudable, are far from matching the due
process and rule of law standards essential for the protection of vital interests.37
The International Law Association's (ILA) Committee on the Accountability
of International Organizations issued its report to the Berlin Conference in
2004, setting out principles for good governance of international organizations
and rules for holding international organizations responsible for their actions.3"
The Report contains detailed Recommended Rules and Practices (RRPs)
formulated by the Committee in order to help strengthen lOs' accountability
regime. The due process and rule of law standards of the Bretton Woods
37. For example, companies that bid for contracts in connection with Bank-financed projects.
Under the Bank's Procurement Guidelines, these companies may be "blacklisted" on the World Bank's
webpage if they engage in fraudulent and corrupt practices in connection with their bidding. "Blacklisting"
entails the Bank's declaration of these firms' ineligibility for participation in future biddings. The World
Bank's decision need not be based on a court's decision finding the bidder actually guilty of fraud or
corruption. Hearsay may suffice as a basis for blacklisting. The single remedy available for a bidder
wrongfully blacklisted is an appeal before the so-called Sanctions Committee that, unlike the Inspection
Panel, is not composed of independent members, but consists of Bank Management members.
38. International Law Association Berlin Conference, Accountability of International
Organizations, I INT'L ORG. L. REv. 221, 229 (2004). The United Nations International Law Commission
is now engaged in a further codification of the accountability of international organizations. The General
Assembly of the United Nations in its fifty-sixth session requested the International Law Commission to begin
work on this topic. G.A. Res. 56/82, 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/82 (Dec. 12, 2001). The ILC considered
compensation or reparation for wrongful acts of international organizations. See Press Release, General
Assembly, Legal Committee Discusses Accountability of International Bodies for Wrongful Acts,
Responsibility for Compensation Payments, U.N.Doc.GA/_3331 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gal3331 .doc.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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institutions do not amount to the desirable degree of protection of equivalent
interests as contemplated by the ILA Committee's RRPs.
VI. ILA COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED RULES AND PRACTICES
The ILA RRPs formulate detailed recommendations for a comprehensive
accountability framework in 1Os such as the Bretton Woods institutions." The
recommendations concern three levels of accountability, which are interrelated
and mutually supportive. The first level concerns the extent to which lOs, in
the fulfillment of their functions as established in their constituent instruments,
are and should be subject to, or should exercise, forms of internal and external
scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability
and/or responsibility. The second level concerns tortious liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts or omissions of the 10 not involving a breach
of any rule of international and/or institutional law. The third level of
responsibility arises out of acts or omissions which do constitute a breach of a
rule of international and/or institutional law (for example violations of human
rights or humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross negligence, or as far as
institutional law is concerned acts of organs which are ultra vires or violate the
law of employment relations).
A. First Level ofAccountability
The ILA Committee RRPs for the first level of accountability rest on eight
principles to guide the institutional and operational activities of lOs and lend
internal and external scrutiny to them. These eight principles are referred to as:
1) Good governance;
2) Good faith;
3) Constitutionality and institutional balance;
4) Supervision and control;
5) Stating the reasons for decisions or a particular course of action;
6) Procedural regularity;
7) Objectivity and impartiality; and
8) Due diligence.
39. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (1LA), COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANtSATIONS, BERLIN CONFERENCE-FINAL REPORT (2004), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/download.cftm/docid/6b708c25-4d6d-42e2-8385dada752815e8 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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The principle of good governance in turn encompasses:
1) Transparency in both the decision-making process and the
implementation of institutional and operational decisions;40
2) A participatory decision-making process;41
3) Access to information;42
4) A well functioning international civil service;43
5) Sound financial management;" and
40. As noted earlier, the IMF and the World Bank have increasingly disclosed policy and summaries
of individual lending arrangements with members. The poorer the aid recipient, the broader the disclosure
imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. There remain, however, considerable parts of their operations
which are hardly made publicly available (e.g., private sector operations, and policy based lending to middle-
income countries).
41. The World Bank consults with NGOs and anyone interested in the matter in connection with
the revision of its lending policies. It also consults-but this consultation is no longer mandatory-NGOs
in connection with individual projects. See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society on the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World
Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 400, 404-06 (2001); see also THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK'S
POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 2, 3 (2002), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/OPSMANUAU
Resources/DisclosurePolicy.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). The IMF equally broadened its institutional
discourse with third parties including NGOs and labor unions. For details, see Leo Van Houtven,
Governance of the IMF-Decision Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency, andAccountability, IMF
Pamphlet Series No. 53, 56-58 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/pam/pam53/
pam53.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
42. For details on the extent of access to information at the IMF, see Van Houtven, supra note 41,
at 58-61. For details on the World Bank, see THE WORLD BANK, supra note 41.
43. Based on explicit charter provisions, both the IMF and the World Bank shall in appointing staff
secure the highest standards of efficiency and of technical competence as well as pay due regard to recruit
personnel on as wide a geographical basis. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. XH(4)(d); IBRD
Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. V(5)(d); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. VI(5)(d).
Moreover, IMF and Bank staff owe their duty entirely to the IMF/the Bank and no other authority, in other
words, are supposed to be impartial in the performance of their function and loyal to the institutions and the
institutional goals. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. XH(4)(c); IBRD Articles of Agreement,
supra note 9, art. V(5)(c); IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 9, art. VI(5)(c). Whether or not the charters
are complied with on a daily basis at the IMF and the World Bank is hard to say from the outside perspective
because personnel statistics and employment details are not the kind of information made publicly available
by the Bretton Woods institutions.
44. As noted earlier, both the IMF and the World Bank publish audited annual reports as well as
interim reports including financial statements which comply with International Accounting Standards (IAS)
in the case of the IMF and with U.S. GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) in the case of the
World Bank. Unfortunately, the Bank does not use GAAP or IAS in connection with the thousands of trust
funds it administers. Regrettably, accounting for these funds is based on simple aggregates. Earmarked trust
fund money was illegally used in 2000/2001 to fill a gap in the Bank's administrative budget. See Stephen
Fidler, Corruption Leads to Freeze on Trust Funds, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 7,2001, at 14. While both
the IMF and the Bank use an internal committee of Executive Directors to oversee management's accounting,
in addition to using an external independent auditor, only the IMF avails itself of a standing committee of
outside auditors. The latter appears to be an equivalent of the mandatory audit committee of independent
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6) Reporting and evaluation.45
It is self-evident that the ILA Committee RRPs first and foremost address
these principles of communication and cooperation between the lOs' organs
and its members. However, the beneficiaries of an 10 should also benefit from
the 10 decision-making process as well. In other words, transparency during
and participation of third parties in the 10 decision-making process mean the
inclusion of these parties in the decision-making process. In this respect, the
ILA Committee RRPs emphasize that beyond the 1Os members third parties
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or third-party beneficiaries of
development projects financed by the Bretton Woods institutions are supposed
to be included in the ILA paradigm of good administration of an 10.
Proprietary information such as commercial and industrial secrets may easily
be protected not by excluding third parties but by preserving confidentiality of
respective parts of documents.
The guiding principle of good faith following at the ILA Committee RRPs
rests on the prohibition of the abuse of rights, honesty, fairness, and
reasonableness in all dealings by the 1O. The principle of constitutionality and
institutional balance means that the 1O is supposed to be acting in accordance
directors that U.S. publicly traded corporations needed to establish based on the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107 P.L. 204, §301, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (2002). In 1995 the
World Bank adopted the "COSO framework" which provides that serious management control deficiencies
should be reported to higher levels, including top management and the Board of Executive Directors. The
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, known as the "Treadway Commission" was
founded in 1985 by the joint sponsorship of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the
American Accounting Association, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the American Accounting Association,
the Institute of Internal Auditors, the Institute of Management Accountants, and the Financial Executives
Institute. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) established
a common definition of management controls.
45. Both the IMF and the World Bank established internal reporting and evaluation departments
early on. Most of these units have been reporting to senior management within the institutions. See, for
example, the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED), renamed Independent Evaluation Group
(lEG) in 2005. As noted earlier, while the Director-General heading lEG now reports to the Executive
Directors, she is less independent than members of the World Bank's Inspection Panel. Compare comment
in n.33, supra. However, after a series of ad hoc investigations into project failures, the IMF established a
permanent independent evaluation function, the Independent Evaluation Office (lEO), in 2000 which, based
on the IMF Board's request evaluates IMF programs. Similarly, the World Bank's Inspection Panel (IP)
investigates allegedly failed projects based on third party complaints or Executive Directors' requests. The
IEO and the IP supplement these Bretton Woods institutions' internal reporting and monitoring functions.
See THE IMF AND ARGENTINA, supra note 32, at 1991-2001; see also Sovereign Debt, supra note 4; THE
WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, supra note 3 1; Bradlow & Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 31, at 393; The
World Bank's Experience with its Inspection Panel, supra note 31; The World Bank Inspection Panel: A
Modelfor Other International Organizations?, supra note 31; Building an International Grievance System:
The World Bank Inspection Panel-Selected Issues, supra note 31.
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with its charter, i.e., not ultra vires. Institutional balance, a term of art derived
from the European Communities/European Union,46 denotes the existence of
institutional checks and balances.47 While the latter does not necessarily need
to amount to the horizontal checks and balances, as they exist within a state
based on the separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) or in the
context of corporate governance (vertical checks and balances among
shareholders, directors, and officers backed by the possibility to use courts for
enforcement purposes in holding directors and officers personally liable for
certain forms of mismanagement), some internal control mechanisms that come
46. The concept of separation of powers (including the development of the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary) developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the constitutional law of the Western
states as institutional checks and balances and a means to protect the individual against the concentration of
uncontrolled state power. The principle of separation of powers in this sense is, however, not incorporated
in the charter of any international organization. As an exception in this respect, the ECJ has introduced the
principle of "institutional balance" under the EC-Treaties to govern the relationship between the EU's
institutions. See Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities, 1990 E.C.R.
2041, 22. The ECJ's rationale to speak of "institutional balance" instead of a separation of powers results
from the fact that the traditional division of governmental functions into the categories of legislative,
executive, and judicial functions does not exist among the EU's institutions. The latter rather share these
functions and none of them can be described as the sole legislator or executive. No other international
organization has yet developed a principle of institutional balance similar to the EU. However, a separation
of functions in the above sense has fortunately evolved in connection with the creation of judicial review
mechanisms of international organizations' decisions vis-h-vis staff or in connection with the establishment
of inspection functions.
47. The efficient implementation ofthe charter based hierarchical institutional balance that prevails
in the IMF and the World Bank which rests on the principle of Executive Directors' overseeing management
may be actually frustrated in the World Bank by the following combination of practices and staff rules. At
the World Bank, management reserved itself early in the history of the World Bank the right to initiate
business in terms of lending for individual projects as well as drafting of general lending policies. This right
to initiate has, in recent years, led to a considerable delay in time in terms of management's reporting on such
initiatives to the Directors, in particular regarding private sector operations and extraordinary initiatives.
Moreover, the World Bank's Staff Rule on Protections and Procedures for Reporting Misconduct
(Whistleblowing) prevents Staff from reporting misconduct to the Board, except for cases involving Board
Officials: "4.01.. .[S]taff members are generally required to report suspected misconduct under this Rule
through...line management and/or INT; the President, a Managing Director, the Senior Vice President and
Group General Counsel, or the Vice President, Human Resources, where reporting to line management and
INT may be inadequate due to risk of retaliation or loss of evidence; and the Ethics Committee of the Board
in cases of suspected misconduct involving Board Officials." The World Bank, Staff Manual, External
Reporting Rule 4.01, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/8.02Policy.pdf (last visited Apr.
1, 2009). The increased vulnerability of international staff whose G-4 visa status in Washington, D.C. is
linked to employment with the Bretton Woods institutions (sixty percent of staff) acts as an additional
disincentive for reporting mismanagement to the Directors. Upon termination of Bank-sponsored residency,
staff members and their families only have a few weeks to leave the United States. Moises Naim, World
Bank: Its Role, Governance, and Organizational Culture, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, Apr.
1994, available at http'/www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfrn?fa=view&id=759 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2009).
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with independence and are not tainted by potential conflict of interests are
desirable in 1Os.4" The principle of supervision and control as explained in the
ILA Committee RRPs pertains to the exercise of regular monitoring and
supervision of organs within 1Os based on the existing hierarchy of those
organs. The principle of reasoned decisions is self-explanatory in the sense that
lOs should avoid making decisions without explaining why they did so; in other
words, IOs should state reasons for their actions and avoid the impression of
arbitrariness. The principle of procedural regularity means that IOs should not
abuse their discretionary powers in making decisions, should avoid errors of
fact or law, and should respect due process. The principle of objectivity and
impartiality calls on the 1Os to avoid arbitrary decisions and decisions that are
unfairly discriminatory. The principle of due diligence requires IOs to ensure
lawfulness of their actions and decisions, to make an effort to avoid claims
against them, and, accordingly, to allow for supervision of the organization by
members.
B. Second Level ofAccountability
At the second level of accountability of 1Os, the ILA Committee RRPs
explicitly expand the body of law applicable to Os. In terms of the relations
between an 10 and its member states, the ILA Committee RRPs refer not only
to the constituent instruments of the organization, but also to rules of general
international law. Equally, in terms of the relations between the 10 and its staff
members, the ILA Committee RRPs not only refer to the respective
employment contracts and to internal staff policies, but also list rules of general
international law as applicable to these relations. When it comes to relations
48. Depending on how the function of General Counsel is exercised within an 10, the latter may
de facto reflect the desirable institutional balance which is a difficult issue in Bretton Woods institutions
given that, as noted earlier, the organ taking the business decisions also decides on the legality of the course
of action. In the history of the World Bank, the late and former General Counsel Ibrahim F.I. Shihata who
served from 1983 to 2001 performed the function of general counsel to a large extent as impartial legal
advisor to the bank's President, its Board of Executive Directors, and its shareholders as opposed to a
corporate counsel primarily advising management. Colleagues and friends inside and outside the institution
have consequently referred to Ibrahim Shihata as the de facto "guardian of the rule of law" within the Bank.
See Khalid M. AI-Saad, Homage to Ibrahim Shihata from the Board of Executive Directors, Formal Liber
Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata Presentation Ceremony (Apr. 9,2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (in particular emphasizing the general counsel's ability to say "no" to the President as well as to the
Board of Executive Directors); Sven Sandstrm, A View of Ibrahim Shihata from a Colleague of Senior
Management, Formal Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata Presentation Ceremony (Apr. 9, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (equally noting the general counsel's objection to a
President backed initiative based on concerns about legality). Sir Joseph Gold, the IMF's late and former
General Counsel, played a similar role in the IMF. See generally JOSEPH GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF Pamphlet No. 32, 1980); see also Die Rolle der internationalen
Finanzinstitutionen, supra note 4, at 204-208.
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between an 10 and third parties, the ILA Committee RRPs emphasize that, in
addition to the contractual terms agreed upon between the organization and
third parties, principles of international law that normally govern such types of
contracts should apply to contracts of the 10 with third parties as well. In the
non-contractual sphere, i.e., where acts of lOs cause personal injury to people
or damage to property, the law of international responsibility will govern the
10's actions vis-6-vis state officials and state property, and local tort law will
govern the 10's conduct, vis-6t-vis individuals and their property. The ILA
Committee RRPs point out that lOs, prior to engaging in operational activities,
should assess the potential damage which these activities may cause and take
precautionary measures to prevent any of those damages and minimize any risk
inherent in their operations. Most importantly, the ILA Committee RRPs
emphasize that lOs should comply with "basic human right obligations."49
C. Third Level of Accountability
At the third level of accountability of lOs, the ILA Committee RRPs are
a legal responsibility of the 10 based on the organization's breach of
international law and an attribution of the action or omission in question to the
10. The identification of acts as those that an 10 engages in or those a state
does, while not an easy one in the context of debate-oriented lOs, is probably
not so difficult to make in connection with Bretton Woods institutions and their
actions. In particular, in connection with investigations undertaken by the
World Bank Inspection Panel, World Bank activities have been neatly identified
and separated from implementation activities under World Bank projects
undertaken by borrowing member countries following the project cycle's
paradigm."
49. For the IMF and the World Bank, this de legeferenda obligation would entail a pre-screening
of projects and programs to be financed against "basic human rights" standards instead of the current practice
which leaves the screening in terms of meeting human rights standards de jure to the borrower. While many
IMF and World Bank projects and programs indirectly promote a number of economic and social rights but
disregard others in connection with primarily neoliberal adjustment programs, the IMF and the World Bank
would have to abandon this selective practice and come up with a list of minimum standards uniformly
applicable to all projects and programs they finance. Because the World Bank is required under its Articles
of Agreement to be non-political, and the IMF is implicitly non-political in nature, such a change in approach
would represent a major shift. Whether or not this move will successfully end the North-South divide is
doubtful. Human rights based development approaches may probably not suffice. See Sovereign Debt, supra
note 4 (calling for a comprehensive overhaul of the Bretton Woods institutions' lending policies).




The ILA Committee RRPs finally discuss appropriate remedies for the
different levels of accountability of an 1O. As a general principle of law
(seemingly international as well as domestic) and basic international human
rights standards, the ILA Committee RRPs acknowledge a right to a remedy
against IOs by states (members as well as non-members) and non-state parties.
Remedies, in the eyes of the ILA committee, should be adequate, effective, and
enforceable. Remedial bodies need not necessarily be courts, but they must be
effectively in a position to give redress against IOs. While the ILA Committee
RRPs leave considerable freedom to lOs in terms of designating respective
remedial bodies, the recommendations are specified in terms of procedural
aspects of remedial actions against lOs. The extent of procedural aspects to be
adhered to varies depending on who is the aggrieved party. Remedial action
brought by member states challenging the legality of particular decisions by the
10 should rely on the institutional setup of the organization which typically
rests on representation of every member state within the organization and the
various organs. By contrast, remedial actions brought by staff members should
be dealt with outside the outdated diplomatic protection paradigm and should
hence rely on an adequate pre-litigation mechanism to deal with employment
related disputes between the organization and the staff member concerned and
proceedings before an international administrative tribunal. The latter tribunal
should function under procedures and conditions that guarantee the tribunal's
independence. 5' Remedial actions instituted by private claimants other than
staff members should be settled by an independent body.52 Tort liability of an
1O should be dealt with by an arbitration mechanism based on a claims
settlement procedure and insurance obtained by the 10 in advance. Claims
against professionals and experts hired by the international organization should
51. As the ILA Committee RRPs add in this context, the burden of proof and evidence is on the 10.
Moreover, the proper administration of justice requires the tribunal to request parties in cases before it to
disclose information and documents directly held by them. The ILA Committee's concept in this respect
draws from the civil law system's investigation rights by the court ("Untersuchungsgrundsatz" in
administrative court proceedings before German courts in cases brought by civil servants whom the
government terminates, whose benefits are cut, or who are not promoted) which may be understood as the
civil law equivalent of pre-trial discovery under U.S. rules of civil procedure. In this respect, the Bretton
Woods institutions' administrative tribunals fall short of the ILA Committee's concept of fair justice.
Professor Robert Vaughn reaches a similar conclusion in his Report on the World Bank's Whistleblower
Procedures (Apr. 30, 2005), http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/Vaughn%20Report.pdf(last visited Mar. 30,
2009).
52. Clearly, the World Bank's Sanctions Committee dealing with complaints by firms that have
been "blacklisted" by the Bank for allegedly engaging in fraud and corruption in connection with their
bidding for the award of a contract under Bank-financed projects does not meet the independence criteria.
2009]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
be dealt with by adequate mechanisms for the investigation of potential criminal
conduct by 1Os and experts.
In conclusion, the ELA Committee RRPs emphasize that they are not
calling for an elimination of the jurisdictional immunity of lOs before domestic
courts nor for an expansion of the jurisdiction of international courts allowing
for proceedings against lOs. Rather, the LA Committee RRPs argue that alter-
native remedial protection can be made available to injured parties via
independent mechanisms which the 10 sets up itself.
VII. END TO THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT
The Bush Doctrine favoring direct and unilateral action by the United
States as a superpower was at odds with the multilateral governance structure
of the World Bank and IMF. In 2004, a political science stakeholder analysis
predicted an end to the Gentlemen's Agreement if the United States ignored the
multilateral decision framework laid out in the Bretton Woods institutions'
Articles of Agreement by acting unilaterally as a hegemon.53
During the Bush Administration, United States leadership in the World
Bank challenged the powers of the Board of Executive Directors under the
World Bank's Articles. Executive Directors did not appreciate when they were
removed from the review of the World Bank's conflict resolution system.
Other examples are the unsuccessful efforts to increase accountability by
reform of the Human Resources and Institutional Integrity Departments as well
as the climate of fear in the World Bank induced by retaliation against whistle-
blowers. The most blatant example of hegemony was the violation of the
diplomatic immunity accorded to Executive Directors by illegal investigations
of the Directors' private bank accounts discussed in Section XI.
As was predicted by the stakeholder analysis, on October 12, 2008 at the
Annual Meeting of the World Bank and LvIF, the Development Committee
announced that the Gentlemen's Agreement should no longer continue: "There
is considerable agreement on the importance of a selection process for the
President of the Bank that is merit-based and transparent, with nominations
open to all Board members and transparent Board consideration of all
53. Jacek Kugler, Stakeholder Analysis on Rule of Law at the World Bank (2004) (on file with the
ILA Committee). The model used in the analysis has analyzed scores of policy issues in over thirty countries,
and was determined to have in excess of 90% accuracy in Randolph M. Siverson, A Glass Half-Full? No,
but Perhaps a Glass Filling: The Contributions ofInternational Politics Research to Policy, 33 POL. SC.
& POL'Y 59 (2000). Jacek Kugler is Elisabeth Helm Rosecrans Professor of World Politics at Claremont
University, Editor of International Interactions and past President of International Studies Association, and
Peace Science Society. He founded the Sentia Group Inc., dedicated to the formal study of decision making,
policy analysis and advice.
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candidates." 4  The IMF's Independent Evaluation Office had previously
recommended in May 2008, that appointment of the Managing Director by the
Europeans should end.55
VIII. HUMAN RESOURCES REFORM
In 1997, the World Bank's shareholders required governance reforms to
promote increased transparency and accountability. World Bank management
was to be evaluated under clear performance criteria against which progress
was measured and for which management was to be held accountable. 6 Dr.
Alberto Bazzan, formerly Director of Leadership Development for IBM in
Europe, Middle East, and Africa came to the World Bank as its Leadership
Development Leader. Dr. Bazzan left the World Bank after two years. The
human resources reforms to require objective, transparent processes in selection
and promotion of managers that Dr. Bazzan had applied at the World Bank
were dismantled and never reintroduced. 7
Several prominent cases involving retaliation against whistleblowers in
recent years have inhibited staff at the Bretton Woods institutions from candid
reporting or debate. This resulting climate of fear is inimical to proper controls
or necessary evaluation. One whistleblower was fired three months after he
assisted the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during
54. WORLD BANK, INT'L MONETARY FUND, DEVELOPMENT COMMITrEE (Oct. 12, 2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/NewsAndEvents/21937474/FinalCommunique 10120
8.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). The Development Committee, known formally as the Joint Ministerial
Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to
Developing Countries, consists of Ministers of Finance or Development of twenty-four countries representing
the full membership of the Bank and Fund.
55. GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF: AN EVALUATION, INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE IMF 22,
84 (2008), http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/eval_05212008.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE IMF].
56. 1997 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 10.
57. On March 13, 2007 Senator Lugar asked the U.S. Executive Director, Mr. Whitney Debevoise,
the following question for the record during confirmation hearings:
As part of the Strategic Compact in 1997, the Board required reform of the World
Bank's policies for the selection and promotion of managers to promote greater
accountability, but these reforms have reportedly not been maintained. Do you think
reform of the World Bank's human resources system is required? If yes, how so?
Response: While I do not know the details of the situation, an effective human
resources system with quality professional staff is critical to delivering development
results. If confirmed, I will look into the status of reform within the Bank's human
resources system.
Questions for the Record, Submitted by Senator RichardLugarfrom the US. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for Mr. Eli Whitney Debevoise, If Nomination Hearing, II0th Cong. 8 (Mar. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter Questions for the Record].
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confirmation hearings for the US Executive Director. Other whistleblowers
included staffwho were fired in retaliation for reporting on corruption in World
Bank projects, cost over-runs at the World Bank's headquarters renovation
project, poor air quality in the World Bank's headquarters, sexual harassment,
failures in projects combating the AIDS pandemic in Africa, over-charges in
interest to World Bank borrowers, improper investigations by the World Bank's
Institutional Integrity Department of the whistleblowers as well as the World
Bank's mediator, improper use of trust funds earmarked by donors to serve
special development initiatives, and inaccurate evaluations of the World Bank's
projects.
The whistleblowers provided a feedback loop to improve the Bretton
Woods institutions' governance by meticulously documenting internal control
deficiencies to oversight agencies of the Bretton Woods institutions, including
interested Executive Directors and relevant Committees of the Board, as well
as member and shareholder oversight agencies. Civil society organizations
such as the ABILA's Committee on Multilateralism and Accountability of
International Organizations, the Government Accountability Project, and the
Open Society Institute joined the effort. With respect to the Bretton Woods
institutions' largest shareholder, the US State and Treasury Departments, and
ultimately the US Congress became involved. After the World Bank stone-
walled Congress' inquiries in one whistleblower case, Senators Leahy, Lugar
and Bayh requested an investigation by the US Government Accountability
Office (GAO) of the World Bank's efficiency and effectiveness; this
investigation was still underway as this Article went to press.
In 2005 the government of the Netherlands requested the World Bank's
Audit Committee to investigate retaliation against one of the whistleblowers.
In the fall of 2008, Ambassadors from Australia, France, and Canada also
requested that whistleblower to keep their respective Executive Directors
apprised. One impetus for this Article is to inform the public at large of other
stakeholders' efforts to introduce accountability into the governance framework
of the Bretton Woods' institutions.
IX. GRIEVANCE SYSTEM REFORM
Legislation introduced by the United States to increase transparency in the
multilateral development banks was not implemented at the World Bank.18
Instead, reforms were introduced under the Bush Administration that obstructed
the access of the Board of Executive Directors to information that would enable
them to exercise their oversight authority. In 1999, the GAO reviewed the
58. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-102, 119 Stat. 2172 (2005).
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World Bank's grievance system reform and requested increased oversight to
restore confidence in a system that employees viewed as neither fair nor
credible.59
The U.S. Treasury Department assured GAO in 1999 that the process for
reform of the grievance system within the World Bank would be closely
monitored. However, staff confidence in the World Bank's conflict resolution
system has continued to decline, as evidenced by a reduction in the numbers of
cases brought.
In 2003, GAO called for a comprehensive assessment of the World Bank's
internal controls over operations and compliance. GAO requested monitoring
to ensure that controls were functioning as intended in compliance with the
World Bank's Articles, policies, and applicable laws of its members and in
preventing misuse of funds.6" An internal control system within a bank cannot
be robust when staff lack confidence that they will be protected from retaliation
for reporting misconduct.
Also in 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern
about reform of the World Bank's grievance system:
The Committee continues to follow the World Bank's efforts to
reform its internal grievance procedures. Despite some progress, it
remains apparent that as long as the Bank and the other international
financial institutions are immune from the court process, they need to
do more to ensure that complaints are independently investigated and
adjudicated in accordance with due process, and that managers are
punished for misconduct, especially retaliation. The Committee is
particularly concerned with the professionalism of the Bank's legal
department, and questions its ability to carry out its responsibilities
fairly and effectively. Among other things, the Bank's lawyers have
expended resources prolonging cases that should have been resolved
quickly, or defended management when it would have been in the
interests of the institution to represent the complainants.6
Notwithstanding the Senate's and GAO's reservations and concerns, the U.S.
Treasury Department informed GAO in 2003 that the World Bank's internal
control system provides adequate assurance that funds are spent as intended.
59. WORLD BANK, STATUS OF GRIEVANCE PROCESS REFORM 19-20 (May 1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99096.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
60. WORLD BANK, IMPORTANT STEPS TAKEN ON INTERNAL CONTROL BUT ADDMONAL
ASSESSMENTS SHOULD BE MADE, 22-23 (June2003), available at http'//www.gao.gov/new.items/d03366.pdf
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
61. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, S. Rep. 107-
219 (2003).
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In 2005, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee held six hearings
on transparency at the multilateral development banks. The 2006 appropria-
tions law, enacted in response, required the World Bank to provide increased
whistleblower protections. In March 2007, Mr. Eli Whitney Debevoise
informed Senator Lugar during his confirmation hearings as U.S. Executive
Director that he intended to work with fellow Executive Directors to address
the weaknesses that GAO had identified in the World Bank's grievance system
and adopt best practices for the protection of whistleblowers.62
On April 25, 2007, the World Bank's Audit and Personnel Committees
rejected a proposed whistleblower policy that did not include external
arbitration, as required by U.S. legislation. The whistleblower policy as adopted
by the Board still provided no recourse to external arbitration, merely leaving
staff with the existing grievance system.63 Most seriously, the policy removed
staff's right to report misconduct directly to multiple authorities within the
World Bank, including to the Board. As mentioned supra, note 34, the
Chairman of the Audit Committee has now decided to commission an external
audit of the World Bank's internal controls.
X. INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY DEPARTMENT
Under the World Bank's whistleblower policy, staff "generally should"
report suspected misconduct either to their managers or to the Institutional
Integrity Department (INT). The World Bank staff lack confidence in INT's
independence. The StaffAssociation Newsletter reported in a May 2005 article
entitled, Staff Want Grievances Handled with Due Process: "INT has been
controversial. Outside watchdog groups and staff have accused management
of using INT to perform punitive investigations on scanty evidence, or of doing
the reverse-calling off a warranted investigation. Victims have included staff
who have revealed accounting or project facts embarrassing to managers ....,64
When the Audit Committee of the Board of Executive Directors
questioned INT's independence, the President commissioned a report by a panel
62. Questions for the Record, supra note 57, 9.
63. See Protections and Procedures for Reporting Misconduct (Whistle-blowing), World Bank Staff
Rule 8.02; "The [new 'whistleblower' protection policy at the World Bank] violates two of four policy criteria
in U.S. law for credible whistleblower protection at International Financial Institutions. After two years of
consultations with the Bank's working group, GAP found that the policy denies those staff members who
disclose misconduct, corruption and fraud: Access to an impartial forum that will hear their claims of
retaliation; A guarantee of employment/reinstatement when they successfully contest retaliatory dismissal."
Government Accountability Project, World Bank Whistleblower Policy Lacks Protections, June 12, 2008,
http://whistleblower.org/content/press-detail.cfm?pressid= 1424 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
64. World Bank Group StaffAssociation, StaffWant Grievances Handled with Due Process, STAFF
ASS'N NEWSL. (May 2005).
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chaired by Paul Volcker. The Volcker Panel left out any investigation into
INT's retaliation against whistleblowers. According to the Volcker Report,
"Approximately 37% of INT staff and three of the four top officials are United
States Nationals. 65
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) (a non-governmental
organization that protects whistleblowers) criticized the Volcker Panel's report
because "a pattern emerged of subjective declarations about a general state of
affairs, followed by a presentation of facts that in many cases contradicts the
previous statement., 66 GAP found it "inexplicable" when the Volcker Panel
failed to mention that INT did not comply with its most recent audit.67
The Volcker Panel did not address internal control deficiencies raised by
INT's lamentable record ofwhistleblower harassment, merely recommending that
cases not involving allegations of significant fraud or corruption should be
reassigned to the Ethics Office. The Volcker Panel failed to consider the internal
control lapses manifested in the Ethics Office as well. The Volcker Panel
attempted to address problems with INT's accountability and independence by
establishing an external oversight advisory board. But the terms of reference of
the oversight board are not sufficiently robust to restore any confidence in INT.
Rather, INT's accountability and Board oversight have been weakened by
requiring INT to report to an operations unit within the World Bank.
Mr. Paul Lachal Roberts, Senior Adviser to the Director General of the
European Commission Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and a participant on the
Volcker Panel, discussed governance issues with European Executive Directors
at the World Bank following his report on the Volcker Panel:
My Director General and I met with a number of European Executive
Directors of the World Bank a few weeks ago to discuss the Volcker
Panel report. At the meeting there was also discussion about gover-
nance issues. My impression was that the European Executive
Directors are well apprised of all relevant issues at the Bank and no
further comment by OLAF is warranted even if it was within our legal
competence.68
65. PAUL A. VOLCKER, CHAIR, INDEP. PANEL REV. OF THE DEP'T OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRrrY 38
(Sept. 13, 2007).
66. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, THE VOLCKER REPORT AND THE GAP REVIEW OF
THE WORLD BANK DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY, http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/2007/
Finai%2OComparisons.doc (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
67. Id.; THE WORLD BANK, AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY (Mar. 30,
2007), http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/2007/Intema %2Auditing/2Olntefim%2OReporLpdf(last visited
Mar. 21, 2009).
68. E-mail from Paul Lachal-Roberts, Adviser to the Director General OLAF, to Karen Hudes (Mar.
29, 2008, 2:09 p.m.).
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Two weeks later, at the Spring Meetings of the World Bank, the European
Commission stated: "Furthermore, I call for an open, transparent process,
based on merit, in selecting future Presidents for the WB [World Bank] and
Managing Directors for the RvIF." '
XI. INVESTIGATIONS OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' PRIVATE BANK AccoUNTs
In June 2007, a coalition of World Bank Board members required Paul
Wolfowitz, the former Pentagon second-in-command, to resign as President of
the World Bank. Wolfowitz had arranged a generous raise for his girlfriend and
World Bank employee Shaha Riza. Several Board members complained that
their private lives were investigated in the hope of unearthing facts that would
disqualify them for demanding Wolfowitz' resignation.7"
The evaluation of the IMF's governance revealed weak capacity of
members and other stakeholders, including legislatures and civil society, to
have their views heard and considered in the institution's decision-making
process.7' The Board and other IMF authorities feared retaliation. EEO surveys
found one-third of authorities and thirty-six percent of Board members believed
that they could criticize staff and Management without fear of repercussions
"rarely" or "only on some issues."72 Fully fifty-six percent of the authorities
and sixty-seven percent of Directors from low-income-countries felt they can
freely criticize staff "rarely" or "only on some issues."73
69. Statement of Mr. Louis Michel, Commissioner for Dev. and Humanitarian Aid of the European
Commission, 6 (Apr. 13, 2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMNT/Documentation/
21728167/DCS2008-0006-EC.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
70. Ad Melkert, Deputy Director of the United Nations Development Program, and former Dutch
Executive Director at the World Bank, confirmed during a fifteen minute interview with Clairy Polak on a
Dutch Public Broadcast program that both his and Herman Wijffels' private lives were subjected to
investigation. Attempts to discredit him were especially intense during the period of May through July, 2007.
See Buitenhof, Politiek Bedryven op het Wereldtoneel [Politics on the World Stage], Sept. 30, 2007,
http://www.vpro.nl/programma/buitenhof/afleveringen/35904442/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
"In my case, there was nothing to find, but my colleagues on the Board of the World Bank were
dismayed. There were definite attempts at disqualification," said Wijffels. See Wijffels boos over 'wroeten"
in zin verleden, DE GELDERLANDER, Sept. 13, 2007, httpJ/www.gelderander.nl/algemeen/dgbinnenland/
1874729/Wijffels-boos-over-wroeten-in-zijn-verleden.ece (last visited Mar. 21,2009) (author's translation).
71. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE IMF, supra note 55, at 8, 126.
72. ASPECTS OF IMF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-INCLUDING THE ROLE OF THE ExECurnvE BOARD:
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS, INT'L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE 36-37, 95 (2008),
http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jsie/kansairesumeIMFsymposium/EEO ReportonCorporateGovemance.pdf.
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009) [hereinafter INT'L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE].
73. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE IMF, supra note 55, at 8,9128; INT'L MONETARY FUND
INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 72.
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XII. PARTNERSHIP WITH ALLIES
In order to preserve its hegemony, the Bush Administration frustrated
reforms required by other member countries as well as U.S. Congress for
increased transparency and accountability in the Bretton Woods institutions.
In one instance, Jean-Marie Le Guen, French National Assembly Vice
President, accused the United States of deliberately attempting "to destabilize"
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF's Managing Director, through revealing a
confidential investigation to ajournalist at the Wall Street Journal.74 After Mr.
Strauss-Kahn apologized for his lapse of judgment in having an affair with a
former staff member at the IMF, he was exonerated from any abuse of his
position as Managing Director. This climate of suspicion and hostility among
NATO nations and other U.S. allies is detrimental to global stability.75
Perhaps Ernest Zedillo, Mexico's former President, who is chairing the
High-Level Commission on World Bank governance, will succeed in restoring
the necessary collaboration at the Bretton Woods institutions for resuscitating
the international financial system. The paucity of checks and balances and lack
of due process for whistleblowers explain the numerous instances of
governance failure documented. Because the Bretton Woods institutions are
at the center of the international financial system, it is crucial to have proper
controls in order to restore confidence. This will require better information
flows, including to the American public, as well as access to justice for the
World Bank's whistleblowers. For this to happen, the American public must
hold its leaders accountable for upholding the obligations of the United States
under the treaties that established the Bretton Woods institutions.76
74. Lizzy Davies, France Rallies Around Head of IMF as Alleged Office Affair Investigated, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 20,2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/20/imf-france-affair-
inquiry (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
75. See JACEK KUGLER, RONALD TAMMEN, & BRIAN EFIRD, THE WAR PRESIDENCY: OPTIONS
TAKEN AND LOST, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION MEETING IN MONTREAL CANADA 12 (2004),
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/pmla-aparesearch-citation/0/7/4/2/7/pages74272/p74272-I .php (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
76. Roughly three-quarters of American public consistently prefers that the United States actjointly
with other nations in foreign affairs. In October 2005, twelve percent preferred United States act as a single
leader, seventy-four percent wanted US to act jointly with other nations and ten percent felt it had no
leadership role to play. Surveys in 1993, 1995, 1997, early Sept. 200 1, mid-Oct. 2001, 2003 and 2004 found
little variation. Douglas C. Foyle, The Convinced, The Skeptical, and the Hostile: American and World
Opinion on the Bush Doctrine, in UNDERSTANDING THE BUSH DOCTRINE 74 (Stanley A. Renshon & Peter
Seudfeld eds., 2007).
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